

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

FILE:

Office: NEW DELHI, INDIA

Date: JAN 16 2004

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(i) and

212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) and

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director

Jun 1.9

Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, New Delhi, India and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of India. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. Additionally the applicant is inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year of more. She is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative filed by her Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) spouse. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(i) and 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) in order to travel to United States and reside with her spouse and child.

The Officer in Charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. See Officer in Charge Decision dated July 16, 2002.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects and the applicant stated that she obtained a photo substituted Indian passport with a nonimmigrant visa and used that passport in February 1997 to gain entry into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. After entry, she remained longer than authorized and subsequently departed on March 6, 2000. The applicant thus accrued unlawful presence in excess of one year making her inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
 - (i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

. . .

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

. . . .

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act regarding fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the reinclusion of the perpetual bar, in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

As stated above, sections 212(i) and 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provide that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to her LPR spouse.

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to sections 212(i) and 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal counsel states that that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now known as Citizenship and Immigration Services, "CIS") did not balance the favorable factors against adverse factors required to decide whether a waiver is merited in the Secretary's discretion.

Before the AAO can review the favorable and unfavorable factors in this case it must first determine if the qualifying family member would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver application were not approved.

Counsel asserts that CIS failed to correctly assess extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse would suffer emotionally if support of this assertion, counsel submits a brief in which he states that his spouse's waiver application was not approved. Counsel further states that may be forced to make a decision of either relocating to India with the applicant or staying in the United States to live with his decided to relocate to India he would suffer child and parents. Furthermore counsel states that if extreme hardship due to the separation from his parents and siblings who live in the United States. In the present case the record reflects that is a native of India and that he met and married the applicant in India. No reason was provided as to why he would not be able to return to India and obtain gainful employment if he decides to relocate to India. Counsel states that father underwent by-pass surgery in November 2000 and that both his parents rely or for physical and physiological support. No documentary evidence was provided to substantiate that father did not recover from his surgery or that he cannot take care of himself and his daily chores. In any event, hardship to the applicant's in-laws is not a consideration in these proceedings.

There are no laws that require to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more that to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. *See Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

In his brief counsel states that suffers from hypertension. receives medication for his hypertension and there is no independent corroboration to show that his medical condition will be jeopardized if he decides to relocate to India with the applicant.

Additionally counsel states that every time the applicant's child would travel to India he would fall sick and there is a chance that the child may develop chronic respiratory illness or asthma due to the polluted environment in India.

As mentioned, section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident *spouse or parent* of such alien. Congress specifically did not mention extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident child. The assertions regarding the hardship the applicant's child would suffer will thus not be considered.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996). U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her LPR spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were not permitted to enter the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.